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The AID Child and In re Marriage of Adams:
Ambiguities in the Illinois Parentage Act (or
Who's Your Daddy?)
I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial insemination is now a widely accepted reproductive
practice.1 According to a recent report, 172,000 women in the
United States underwent artificial insemination in 1987 and 65,000
births resulted.2 As the use of this procedure has become more
common, courts have been forced to deal with the many legal com-
plications that accompany it.3
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District decided In
re Marriage of Adams,4 a divorce proceeding in which the husband
of an artificially inseminated woman refused to provide child sup-
port for the resulting child because he claimed that he was not the
child's legal father. Under the Illinois Parentage Act ("IPA"),5 a
husband who consents in writing to his wife's insemination is con-
1. See Goldstein, Artificial Insemination by Donor--Status and Problems, in GENET-
ICS AND THE LAW 197 (A. Milunsky and G. Annas eds. 1976). Because approximately
15% of all married couples are infertile, with the male responsible 40% of the time,
artificial insemination by donor ("AID") has become a major technique employed in
therapy of couples with infertility problems. Id. See also L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEP-
TIONS: A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST INFERTILITY TREATMENTS, INCLUD-
ING IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, AND SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD 159-96 (1984).
2. Marwick, Artificial Insemination Faces Regulation, Testing of Donor Semen, Other
Measures, JAMA, at 1339, Sept. 9, 1988 (statistics based on recent study from the Office
of Technology Assessment).
3. See Healey, Legal Regulation of Artificial Insemination and the New Reproductive
Technologies, in GENETICS AND THE LAW III 139 (A. Milunsky and G. Annas eds.
1984). See also E. NOBLE, HAVING YOUR BABY BY DONOR INSEMINATION 239-81
(1987) (discussing legal implications of artificial insemination with respect to legitimacy,
divorce and support obligations, adultery, inheritance rights, and donor rights); L. AN-
DREWS, supra note 1, at 188-95. For a summary of reports by AID commissions world-
wide, see G. ANNAS & S. ELIAS, REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS AND THE LAW 235-38
(1987).
4. 174 Ill. App. 3d 595, 528 N.E.2d 1075 (2d Dist. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 133
Ill. 2d 437, 551 N.E.2d 635 (1990).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 1451-1453 (1989).
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sidered the legal father of the resulting child.6 The statute is silent,
however, as to the legal status of a child thus conceived without
the husband's consent. In Adams, the court considered whether
the husband, who did not give written consent to the insemination
as required by the IPA, nevertheless was obligated to provide child
support.7
The court also considered whether the statute prohibited the
wife from relying on common law remedies, such as the doctrine of
equitable estoppel,8 to prove that her husband actually consented
to the insemination and thus force her husband to provide child
support.9 In addition, the court addressed which party should bear
the burden of proving the husband's actual consent to the wife's
insemination, or the lack of such consent, if equitable relief is avail-
able.' 0 The Adams court held that the wife could rely on common
law remedies to prove that her husband actually consented to the
procedure, that the husband's conduct amounted to actual consent,
and that the husband bore the burden to prove non-consent. I The
court, therefore, ordered the husband to provide support for the
child.' 2
Subsequently, Adams was reversed by the Illinois Supreme
Court because the trial court incorrectly applied Illinois law to the
dispute. Nonetheless, the appellate court decision remains impor-
tant 3 because it is the only Illinois court decision in the last thirty
6. Id. paras. 1452-1453. For the full text of these provisions, see infra note 54.
7. Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 599, 528 N.E.2d at 1076.
8. Equitable estoppel is defined as the "preclusion of a person by his act or conduct or
silence from asserting rights which might otherwise have existed." BLACK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 637 (4th ed. 1968).
9. Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 611, 528 N.E.2d at 1084.
10. Id. at 615, 528 N.E.2d at 1087.
11. Id. at 615, 618, 619, 528 N.E.2d at 1087-89.
12. Id. at 615, 618, 528 N.E.2d at 1087, 1089.
13. In re Marriage of Adams, 133 Ill. 2d 437, 447-48, 551 N.E.2d 635, 638-40 (1990).
For a discussion of the Illinois Supreme Court opinion, see infra notes 151-61 and accom-
panying text.
[Editor's Note: In the absence of clarification from the legislature, the Illinois Supreme
Court may be forced to return to this issue in the future. More and more couples are
turning to innovative reproductive techniques, including the use of sperm donors, surro-
gate mothers, and in vitro fertilization. This development is due to an increase in fertility
problems resulting from delaying pregnancy, and a corresponding decrease in the number
of children available for adoption because of the ready availability of family planning and
legalized abortion. See Matter of Adoption of Baby Girl L. J., 132 Misc.2d 972, 505
N.Y.S.2d 813 Sur. 1986) (noting that the wait for a child to adopt may be as long as seven
years, thus forcing couples to resort to scientific methods in order to conceive a child).
As the use of these techniques grows, courts and legislatures will be required to address
the ethical and legal implications of this new biotechnology. In a pivotal case involving
conception through artificial insemination and surrogate motherhood, the court stated:
1174 [Vol. 21
The AID Child
years to address the legal impact that artificial insemination has
upon a husband's support obligations to the resulting child. In ad-
dition, Adams exposes deficiencies in the Illinois statute governing
the legal relationship between a husband and the child his wife
conceives through artificial insemination.
This Note first discusses the technique of artificial insemination
and reviews Illinois' judicial and legislative response to artificial
insemination.14 It then examines In re Marriage of Adams"5 and
analyzes Adams in light of the Illinois Parentage Act. 6 Finally,
this Note suggests changes to the Act that would provide more
adequate protection for the interests of children conceived through
artificial insemination.' 7
II. BACKGROUND
A. Types of Artificial Insemination
There are two types of artificial insemination.' The first varia-
tion of the procedure is homologous artificial insemination
("AIH"). 9 In this procedure, a woman is impregnated with the
semen of her husband.2 ° The other, more common variation is the
artificial insemination donor method ("AID").2' Unlike AIH, this
reproductive technique involves an anonymous sperm donor.22 Be-
"The problem is how to enjoy the benefits of the technology---especially for infertile
couples-while minimizing the risk of abuse. The problem can be addressed only when
society decides what its values and objectives are in this troubling, yet promising area."
Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (N.J. 1988).]
14. See infra notes 18-66 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 67-161 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 162-182 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 183-186 and accompanying text.
18. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY 1447-48 (Vol. II
1986).
19. Id.
20. Id. Doctors employ AIH when natural reproduction is not possible due to impo-
tence or drug-induced erectile dysfunction. Id.
21. Id. For additional discussion about this procedure, see Goldstein, supra note 1, at
197. AID is used to treat infertile couples when the male is sterile or has a sperm abnor-
mality, or when there is a risk of transmitting a genetic or infectious disease. Id. at 197-
98; G. ANNAS & S. ELIAS, supra note 3, at 227-28. For commentary on the right to use
AID, see Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 428 (1983).
22. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY 1447-48 (Vol. II
1986). For commentary on a third variation of this procedure, see Comment, Artificial
Insemination and Surrogate Motherhood-A Nursery Full of Unresolved Questions, 17
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 913, 917 (1981). This third variation is known as "confused"
artificial insemination ("AIC"). Id. Under this procedure, a woman is inseminated with
a mixture of her husband's and a donor's sperm. Id. See also Wadlington, Artificial
Insemination: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 469 (1983). This
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cause most legal complications involving artificial insemination
stem from the AID method, 3 this Note will focus exclusively upon
the use of AID.
B. Judicial Response to the AID Child's Legitimacy
Artificial insemination has raised the legal question of the legiti-
macy24 of a child conceived through this procedure.2 5 Historically,
Illinois courts uniformly have applied a strong presumption that a
child naturally born or conceived during marriage is legitimate.26
In 1985, the Illinois legislature codified this presumption.2 7 This
variation has no medical superiority over the usual AID procedure and is much less
popular today than it was a decade or two ago. Id.; L. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 180.
Recent research warns against mixing sperm because the addition of the husband's sperm
may reduce the possibility of fertilization. Id.
23. Oakley, Test Tube Babies: Proposals for Legal Regulation of New Methods of
Human Conception and Prenatal Development, 8 FAM. L.Q. 385, 386 (1974).
24. Legitimacy is defined as "[l]awful birth; the condition of being born in wedlock."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1046 (4th ed. 1968). Illegitimacy is defined as "[t]he state or
condition of one whose parents were not married at the time of his birth." Id. at 882.
25. Some courts have held that children conceived through AID are legitimate. See,
e.g., People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968); Strnad v.
Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948). Other courts have determined
that AID children are illegitimate. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242
N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Doornbos v. Dcornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct.
Cook County, Ill. Dec. 13, 1954), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 12 Ill. App. 2d
473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956). For additional commentary on legitimacy and the AID
child, see L. ANDREWS, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
33-35 (American Bar Foundation Working Paper No. 8701, 1987); Noble, supra note 3,
at 242-48.
26. Simcox v. Simcox, 175 Ill. App. 3d 473, 475, 529 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1st Dist.
1988); In re Estate of Hutchins, 120 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1089, 458 N.E.2d 1356, 1359 (4th
Dist. 1984); People ex rel. Valle v. Valle, 113 Ill. App. 3d 682, 686, 447 N.E.2d 945, 949
(1st Dist. 1983); Happel v. Mecklenburger, 101 111. App. 3d 107, 112, 427 N.E.2d 974,
978 (1st Dist. 1981); People ex rel. Adams v. Mitchell, 89 111. App. 3d 1023, 1028, 412
N.E.2d 678, 682 (1st Dist. 1980); In re Ozment, 61 111. App. 3d 1044, 1047, 378 N.E.2d
409, 411 (3d Dist. 1978); People ex rel. Smith v. Cobb, 33 Ill. App. 3d 68, 70, 337 N.E.2d
313, 315 (1st Dist. 1975); People ex rel. Jones v. Schmitt, 101 Ill. App. 2d 183, 186, 242
N.E.2d 275, 276 (3rd Dist. 1968); People ex rel. Gonzalez v. Monroe, 43 Ill. App. 2d 1, 7,
192 N.E.2d 691, 693 (2d Dist. 1963). The court in People v. Powers, 340 Ill. App. 201,
204, 91 N.E.2d 637, 639 (1st Dist. 1950), explained that this presumption originates in
the need for family stability and in the need to protect helpless infants who would be
"tarred forever with the stigma of illegitimacy" without this presumption.
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2505(a) (1989). Section 5(a), entitled "Presump-
tion of Paternity," provides:
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if: (1) he and the
child's natural mother are or have been married to each other, even though the
marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the child is born or conceived
during such marriage; or (2) after the child's birth, he and the child's natural
mother have married each other, even though the marriage is or could be de-
clared invalid, and he is named, with his consent, as the child's father on the
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presumption, however, may be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence.28 Such evidence conclusively must establish that the
husband was unable to procreate or that circumstances rendered it
impossible for the husband to father the child.29
Regardless of the presumption of legitimacy afforded naturally
born or conceived children, however, Illinois courts have been re-
luctant to legitimize AID children, irrespective of the husband's
consent to the procedure.30 The issue of AID children's legitimacy
has been addressed by only two Illinois courts, both in the context
of divorce proceedings.3' In these two cases, Illinois courts began
to analyze the rights of both the AID child and the husband of the
woman who is inseminated. In the first case,32 the court indicated
that artificial insemination did not constitute grounds for divorce
as adultery.33 In the second case34 the court strongly opposed le-
child's birth certificate pursuant to Section 12 of the "Vital Records Act," ap-
proved August 8, 1961, as amended.
Id. For commentary on this statute, see Klages, The Illinois Parentage Act of 1984: The
Continuing Shift Toward Civil Enforcement, 73 ILL. B.J. 564 (1985).
28. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 40, para. 2505(b) (1989). See Simcox, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 475,
529 N.E.2d at 1034; People ex rel Brown v. Bloodworth, 155 Ill. App. 3d 901, 905, 508
N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (5th Dist. 1987); Hutchins, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 1089, 458 N.E.2d at
1359; Happel, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 112, 427 N.E.2d at 979; People ex rel. Smith v. Cobb, 33
Ill. App. 3d at 70, 337 N.E. 2d at 313. The Illinois Supreme Court first enunciated this
standard in Orthwein v. Thomas, 127 Ill. 554, 21 N.E. 430 (1889). In that case, the court
noted that this presumption should be very difficult to rebut because the law is unwilling
to bastardize children. Orthwein, 127 Ill. at 562, 21 N.E. at 431-32. See generally Note,
The Burden of Proof in a Paternity Action, 25 J. FAM. L. 357 (1986); Note, R.McG. &
C. W. v. J. W. & W W.: The Putative Father's Right to Standing to Rebut the Marital
Presumption of Paternity, 76 N.W. U.L. REV. 669 (1981).
29. Happel, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 112, 427 N.E.2d at 979.
30. For a general discussion of legitimacy and the AID child, see Smith, The Razor's
Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Surrogate Mothers, 5 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 639, 641-43 (1983); Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The Dangers of a Poorly
Kept Secret, 64 NW. U.L. REv. 777, 785-92 (1970); Comment, New Reproductive Tech-
nologies.: The Legal Problem and a Solution, 49 TENN. L. REV. 303, 312-16 (1982).
31. See Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct. Cook County, Ill. Dec.
13, 1954), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844
(1956); Hoch v. Hoch, No. 44-C-8307 (Cir. Ct. Cook County Ill. 1945) (unreported case
as cited by Oakley, supra note 23, at 387 n.17. For additional discussion of Hoch, see
Comment, Artificial Human Reproduction: Legal Problems Presented by the Test Tube
Baby, 28 EMORY L.J. 1045, 1072 n. 160 (1979). Although these are the only two Illinois
cases that have addressed this issue, the argument that the legal father of an AID child is
the husband of the inseminated woman was raised by a party to a more recent contested
adoption case. See In re Adoption of McFadyen, 108 Ill. App. 3d 329, 438 N.E.2d 1362
(2d Dist. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983). In that case, however, the court
dismissed the argument as inapplicable to the facts presented and never reached the mer-
its of the artificial insemination argument. McFadyen, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 335-37, 438
N.E.2d at 1366-67.
32. Hoch, No. 44-C-8307 (Cir. Ct. Cook County Il. 1945).
33. Comment, supra note 31, at 1072 n. 160 (discussing Hoch).
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gitimizing the AID child because it concluded that artificial insem-
ination is equivalent to adultery and therefore, any child resulting
from the procedure is illegitimate.35
The first Illinois court to discuss the legitimacy of an AID child
was Hoch v. Hoch,36 in which the husband sought a divorce from
his wife on the grounds of adultery.37 In Hoch, the husband re-
turned home after a two-year absence to find his wife pregnant.38
The wife contended that her pregnancy was the result of AID, and
not adultery. 39 The court indicated that artificial insemination did
not constitute grounds for divorce as adultery.4 The wife, how-
ever, had committed adultery in the conventional way.41 Hence,
the court concluded that the child was illegitimate in the tradi-
tional sense and granted the divorce.42
The legitimacy of an AID child again was addressed in Doornbos
v. Doornbos.43 In Doornbos, the wife, seeking a divorce, asked an
Illinois trial court to rule that AID was not adultery and that her
AID child was legitimate." Instead, the Doornbos court ruled that
AID, with or without the consent of the husband, is contrary to
public policy and morality.45 Thus, the court held that an AID
child is born out of wedlock and therefore, is illegitimate. 6
Doornbos concluded that the husband was not the child's father
and had no legal right to the child.47
C. Illinois Parentage Act
Hoch and Doornbos illustrate some of the legal questions raised
34. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308.
35. Id.
36. No. 44-C-8307 (Cir. Ct. Cook County IlI. 1945).
37. Oakley, supra note 23, at 387 n.17 (discussing Hoch).
38. Comment, supra note 31, at 1072 n.160 (discussing Hoch).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. For further commentary on the holding in Hoch, see Comment, supra note
22, at 920.
42. Comment, supra note 31, at 1072 n. 160 (discussing Hoch).
43. 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct. Cook County, Ill. Dec. 13, 1954), appeal dismissed
on procedural grounds, 12 111. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956).
44. Comment, supra note 31, at 1072 n.160 (discussing Doornbos). Doornbos is only
briefly summarized at 23 U.S.L.W. 2308. Therefore, additional source material is refer-
enced to provide a lengthier discussion of the facts in this case.
45. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. at 2308.
46. Id. at 2308. The court concluded that the wife's use of AID was equivalent to
adultery. Id. For further commentary on Doornbos, see Wadlington, supra note 30, at
788; Levisohn, Dilemma in Parenthood: Socio-legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemi-
nation, 36 CHL KENT L. REV. 1, 23 (1959); E. NOBLE, supra note 3, at 262.
47. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. at 2308.
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by artificial insemination.4" In response to these and other similar
questions, the National Council of Commissioners of State Laws
promulgated the Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA")49 in 1973.50
Under the UPA, if a husband consents to the AID procedure, the
child born to his wife as a result of this procedure is considered the
his legal child.5 Soon after the creation of the UPA, state legisla-
tures began to enact AID statutes modeled after the UPA. 52 The
Illinois legislature enacted the Illinois Parentage Act ("IPA")5 3 in
1984, essentially adopting the language of the UPA.5 4
48. See supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text.
49. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, 9B U.L.A. 301-45 (1987).
50. See UNIF. PARENTAGE AT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987) (Commissioners' com-
ment). The UPA specifically focuses upon the paternity of the AID child in Section 5.
That section provides:
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of
her husband, a wife is artificially inseminated with semen donated by a man not
her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a
child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing and signed
by him and his wife. The physician shall certify their signatures and the date of
the insemination, and file the husband's consent with the [State Department of
Health], where it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the
physician's failure to do so does not affect the father and child relationship. All
papers and records pertaining to the insemination, whether part of the perma-
nent record or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only upon an order of the
court for good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a married woman other that the donor's wife is treated in law as
if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). For a discussion of the development
and implications of the UPA, see Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1
(1974). See also Krause, Artificial Conception: Legislative Approaches, 19 FAM. L.Q. 185,
195 nn. 52, 53 (1985). For commentary on proposed modifications of the UPA, see Com-
ment, supra note 30, at 332-41.
51. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987).
52. See UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, 9B U.L.A. 2 (Prefatory table, Supp. 1990). The
Uniform Parentage Act has been adopted by the following 17 states: Alabama, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
vada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, Wyoming. Id.
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 1451-1453 (1989).
54. Compare id. with UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). Section 2
of the IPA provides:
Any child born as the result of heterologous artificial insemination shall be con-
sidered at law in all respects the same as a naturally conceived child of the
husband and wife so requesting and consenting to the use of such technique.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1452 (1989).
Section 3 of the IPA provides:
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of
her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not
her husband, the husband shall be treated in law as if he were the natural father
of the child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing exe-
cuted and acknowledged by both the husband and wife. The physician who is
1180 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 21
The IPA first was introduced to the Illinois legislature as Senate
Bill 61. 55 At the third reading of this bill, Senator John D'Arco
explained that the bill was designed to clarify who the legal father
of an AID child would be.5 6 During the subsequent House debates
on this bill, Representative Steven Nash explained that the bill
would establish that, if the husband of a woman who is artificially
inseminated consents to the insemination, then he would be consid-
ered the resulting child's natural father. 57 After further discussion,
the House passed the bill.58 Governor James Thompson cast an
amendatory veto of this bill.59 The Governor proposed that Sec-
tion 3 60 be eliminated, thus rendering the bill silent as to the rela-
tionship between the AID child and the husband of the woman
who was inseminated.6'
After the Governor's amendatory veto, the House reconvened
to perform the technique shall certify their signatures and the date of the insem-
ination, and file the husband's consent in the medical record where it shall be
kept confidential and held by the patient's physician. However, the physician's
failure to do so shall not effect the legal relationship between the father and the
child. All papers and records pertaining to the insemination, whether part of
the permanent medical record held by the physician or not, are subject to in-
spection only upon an order of the court for good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife shall be treated in law as if
he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1453 (1989). For text of section 5 of the UPA, see supra
note 50.
55. 83RD ILL. GEN. ASSEM., SENATE PROCEEDINGS, May 19, 1983, 44 (debates on
Senate Bill 61).
56. Id. Senator D'Arco noted that in In re Adoption of McFadyen, 108 Ill. App. 3d
329, 438 N.E.2d 1362 (2d Dist. 1982), the court seemed to indicate that the donor would
be the legal father of the AID child. Id. D'Arco referred to this case as "McFadden" in
error. Because no Illinois "McFadden" case mentions artificial insemination, it is clear
that he was referring to McFadyen. Senator D'Arco disagreed with the court's conclu-
sion and stated that the legal father should be the husband of the woman who is artifi-
cially inseminated. Id. Although D'Arco misconstrued the McFadyen holding, which
did not actually address the legal parentage of the AID child, his comments are relevant
to his interpretation of the bill's purpose. For additional discussion of McFadyen, see
supra note 3 1.
57. 83RD ILL. GEN. ASSEM., HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, June 24, 1983, 171 (debates on
Senate Bill 61).
58. 83RD ILL. GEN. ASSEM., HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, June 24, 1983, 174.
59. See 83RD ILL. GEN. ASSEM., HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, Nov. 2, 1983, 81 (debates on
Senate Bill 61).
60. Section 3 is codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1453 (1989). Among other
things, this section clarifies the legal relationship between the AID child and the con-
senting husband. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1453 (1989). For the complete text of
this section, see supra note 54.
61. See 83RD ILL. GEN. ASSEM., HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, Nov. 2, 1983, 81-82 (debates
on Senate Bill 61).
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and discussed the bill further.62 At that time, Representative Rich-
ard Brummer proposed postponing passage of the bill until certain
ambiguities in the bill could be resolved. 63 Specifically, Represen-
tative Brummer noted that the bill as amended by the Governor's
veto did not address what happens when a married woman is artifi-
cially inseminated without the consent of her husband, who has
support obligations."M Apparently, Representative Brummer be-
lieved that the bill as originally passed did address the legal status
of a child conceived by artificial insemination. According to
Brummer, the bill as originally passed provided that a child so con-
ceived without the consent of the husband was not the husband's
legal child.65
The House subsequently overrode the Governor's amendatory
veto and passed the legislation as originally approved by the legis-
lature.66 Notwithstanding Representative Brummer's interpreta-
tion of the bill as passed, the plain language of the IPA as enacted
is unclear because it fails expressly to address the legal status of an
AID child born without the husband's written consent. The IPA's
express language is strictly confined to those instances when the
woman obtains her husband's written consent to the procedure.
Moreover, the IPA does not create a presumption of consent that
would insure the legitimacy of a child conceived artificially.
III. IN RE MARRIAGE OF ADAMS
A. Facts
In 1984, Ritaray Adams ("Ritaray") underwent the AID proce-
dure without the written consent of her sterile husband, John Ad-
ams ("John").67 As a result of the procedure, Ritaray conceived
62. 83RD ILL. GEN. ASSEM., HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, Nov. 2, 1983, 81.
63. Id. at 81-82.
64. Id, Representative Brummer stated: "I would respectfully suggest that we would
be better off not accepting the Governor's amendatory veto and not putting.., a law on
the books that everyone now seems to agree is somewhat ambiguous and does create
some problems." Id at 82.
65. See 83RD GEN. ASSEM., HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, June 24, 1983, 172 (debates on
Senate Bill 61). During debate, Representative Brummer noted that the bill required the
husband's written consent to the wife's insemination and stated: "I think that's a very
important distinction [the written consent requirement]; because, if the husband does not
consent, he would certainly not want to be put in the position of being deemed to be the
father of that child." Id.
66. 83RD ILL. GEN. ASSEM., HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, Nov. 2, 1983, at 83.
67. In re Marriage of Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 602, 528 N.E.2d at 1078, rev'd on
other grounds, 133 Ill. 2d 437, 551 N.E.2d 635 (1990).
1990] 1181
Loyola University Law Journal
and gave birth to a son, John David ("J.D."). 6s Shortly thereafter,
Ritaray filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, in which she
also sought child support for her son, J.D..69 Before trial, John
moved for summary judgment on the child support issue. ° He
claimed that he was not J.D.'s legal father because he never had
given written consent to his wife's insemination as required under
the IPA.7 ' Therefore, John argued that he should not be required
to pay child support.72 In response to John's motion, Ritaray al-
leged that he had orally consented to her insemination and that he
had never objected to the insemination prior to the time the proce-
dure was performed.73
The trial court denied John's motion because an issue of fact
existed as to whether John gave actual consent to the procedure.74
At trial, the court determined that John actually had consented to
the AID procedure. 7 ' The court reasoned that actual consent
would waive the statutory prerequisite of written consent. 76 Ac-
cordingly, the trial court awarded Ritaray sole custody of J.D. and
directed John to pay child support.77
John appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second
District.7 He claimed that the trial court should have granted his
motion for summary judgment because the IPA mandates a hus-
band's written consent before a parental obligation may be im-
posed. 79 He argued that the trial court abused its discretion when
it denied his motion because the absence of his written consent was
68. Id. at 603, 528 N.E.2d at 1079.
69. Id. at 604, 528 N.E.2d at 1080.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 604, 606, 528 N.E.2d at 1080-81. Under the IPA, "[t]he husband's consent
must be in writing executed and acknowledged by both the husband and wife." ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1453 (1989).
73. Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 608, 528 N.E.2d at 1082.
74. Id. at 607, 528 N.E.2d at 1082.
75. Id. at 604, 528 N.E.2d at 1080. The trial court made thirty-five separate findings
of fact with respect to John's actual consent. Id. at 611, 528 N.E.2d at 1085. For a list of
these findings, see infra note 84. In making these findings, the trial court acknowledged
that John and Ritaray advanced diametrically opposed theories on the issue of consent
and that both parties were impeached on certain points to which each testified. Adams,
174 Ill. App. 3d at 614, 528 N.E.2d at 1086.
76. Id. at 607, 528 N.E.2d at 1082. The trial court concluded that John was estopped
from denying his legal parental responsibilities and mandated that he pay child support
for J.D. Id. at 604-05, 528 N.E.2d at 1080.
77. Id. at 605, 528 N.E.2d at 1080.
78. Id. at 605, 528 N.E.2d at 1081.
79. Id. at 606, 528 N.E.2d at 1081.
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undisputed.80 John further argued that the evidence did not estab-
lish that he actually consented to his wife's insemination.81 In re-
sponse, Ritaray again contended that John orally had consented to
her insemination, and that he had failed to object to her insemina-
tion at any time prior to the procedure.8 2 Ritaray argued that
John's actions regarding her insemination constituted his waiver of
the statute's written consent requirement, and that therefore John
was estopped from denying legal parentage.8 3
B. The Majority Opinion
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision and held
that John's actions were legally sufficient to estop him from deny-
ing his support obligation.84 First, the court rejected John's argu-
ment that the IPA provision requiring written consent barred
80. Id. at 605, 528 N.E.2d at 1081.
81. Id. at 611, 528 N.E.2d at 1084.
82. Id. at 608, 528 N.E.2d at 1082.
83. See id. at 607-08, 528 N.E.2d at 1082.
84. Id. at 618, 528 N.E.2d at 1089. Of the trial court's findings of fact, the appellate
court found the following findings to be "significant":
1. In order to have children with Ritaray, John tried on two occasions to have
his vasectomy reversed.
2. The parties discussed the AID procedure which was primarily introduced
to Ritaray through the medical writings John brought home and John's conver-
sations. John also obtained the address of [the doctor who performed the
procedure].
3. Both parties visited with [the doctor] together to discuss the AID proce-
dure. No written consent or affirmative oral consent was given to [the doctor]
by either party. Most of the conversation was between John and [the doctor].
4. In 1984, Ritaray made visits to [the doctor] which were known to John.
5. John was aware that Ritaray was using a basal thermometer and charting
her body temperature.
6. John knew about the sonograms Ritaray had and paid for them.
7. John knew about Ritaray's appointment for the AID procedure.
8. John took Lamaze classes with Ritaray.
9. John and Ritaray discussed child care and breast feeding.
10. John and Ritaray discussed names for the baby.
11. John went with Ritaray to the hospital for J.D.'s birth.
12. John never objected to his name on the birth certificate showing him as the
father.
13. J.D. was listed as a dependent on John and Ritaray's 1985 Federal tax
return which John had caused to be prepared.
14. During the six weeks after J.D.'s birth and leaving for Illinois, John
helped care for J.D.
15. John bought a present for J.D. for Christmas 1985.
16. The settlement agreement proposed by John in early 1986 had the follow-
ing provisions:
A. The parental responsibility for the minor child, namely, John David Ad-
ams, born August 4, 1985, shall be shared by both parties.
B. The primary custody and physical residence of said minor child shall be
1184 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 21
further inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the decision to
utilize the AID procedure. s5 In determining whether actual con-
sent is a sufficient substitute for written consent, the court engaged
in a lengthy analysis of R.S. v. R.S.. s6
In R.S., a Kansas appellate court faced an analogous fact pattern
and construed a similar statute.8 7 In R.S., the husband orally con-
sented to the wife's participation in AID. s8 Like John, the hus-
band in R.S. argued that he was not required to pay child support
because the Kansas statute required a husband's written consent.8 9
The R.S. court reviewed the statute and concluded that the Kansas
legislature did not intend that a husband who orally consented to
AID should escape parental obligation.' Invoking the doctrines
with the wife. The husband shall have the right to visit with and be visited by
the minor child at reasonable times and places.
C. The husband shall pay to the wife, as and for child support, the sum of
$50. Payable on the 15th and 30th of every month commencing March 15,
1986, for a total of $100 per month, and continuing each and every month, until
such time as said minor child reaches his majority, marries or becomes self-
supporting, whichever comes first.
17. Other than John's alleged conversations with Ritaray which she denied,
John had no conversations with anyone else in which he denied consent to
Ritaray's AID procedure, or in which he disclaimed parental responsibility for
J.D. until after dissolution proceedings were filed.
18. John made no written statement or communication to anyone at all in
which he denied consent to Ritaray's AID procedure, or disclaimed parental
responsibility for J.D., until after the dissolution proceedings were filed.
Id. at 611-13, 528 N.E.2d at 1085.
85. Id. at 610-11, 528 N.E.2d at 1084.
86. Id. at 608-10, 528 N.E.2d at 1082-84 (reviewing R.S. v. R.S., 9 Kan. App. 2d 39,
670 P.2d 923 (1983)).
87. R.S., 9 Kan. App. 2d at 39, 670 P.2d at 924. See KANSAS STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128,
23-130 (1981). Section 23-128 of the Kansas statute provides: "The technique of heterol-
ogous artificial insemination may be performed in this state at the request and with the
consent in writing of the husband and wife desiring the utilization of such technique for
the purpose of conceiving a child or children." Id. § 23-128. Section 23-130 of the Kan-
sas statute provides: "The consent provided for in this act shall be executed and ac-
knowledged by both the husband and the wife and the person who is to perform the
technique." Id. § 23-130.
88. R.S., 9 Kan. App. 2d at 40, 670 P.2d at 925.
89. Id. at 41, 670 P.2d at 926. For the relevant text of the Kansas statute, see supra
note 87.
90. R.S., 9 Kan. App. 2d at 44, 670 P.2d at 927-28. The Adams court noted that
after reviewing pertinent case law, the R.S. court considered the statute and found no
indication that the Kansas legislature intended that a husband who orally consents to the
AID procedure cannot be held liable on an equitable estoppel or implied consent theory.
Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 609, 528 N.E.2d at 1084 (citing R.S., 9 Kan. App. 2d at 44,
670 P.2d at 928). The R.S. court held that a husband's consent to his wife's insemination
is presumed to continue through conception unless the husband establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that he withdrew such consent. R.S., 9 Kan. App. 2d at 44, 670
P.2d at 928. The R.S. court also held that a husband who, in the presence of his wife and
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of equitable estoppel and implied consent, the R.S. court then con-
cluded that the husband had a duty to support the AID child.9'
John argued that a showing of actual consent cannot be used to
create a support obligation because the term "must" in connection
with the IPA requirement of written consent barred a claim for a
support obligation when that written consent is not obtained.92
According to John, the legislative intent expressed in the IPA's
language precluded the court from waiving the written consent re-
quirement.93 Based on R.S., however, the court rejected John's ar-
guments.94 The court interpreted the IPA's "must" language as
the treating physician, orally consents to his wife's insemination is estopped from denying
that he is the child's father. He impliedly has agreed to support the child and act as its
father. Id.
91. Id. The Adams court explained that the R.S. court reviewed several decisions
from other states in which a duty to provide child support was based upon the husband's
actions. Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 609, 528 N.E.2d at 1083. In its discussion of R.S.,
Adams reviewed the cases that R.S. considered. Id at 609-10, 528 N.E.2d at 1083-84.
The R.S. court reviewed Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct.
1963), in which that court imposed a support obligation upon a husband who consented
in writing to the AID procedure. R.S., 9 Kan. App. 2d at 41-43, 670 P.2d at 926-27. The
Gursky court reasoned that a husband's conduct, including written consent to the proce-
dure, implied his promise to furnish support for any resulting offspring. Gursky, 39 Misc.
2d at 1088, 242 N.S.Y.2d at 411. Gursky recognized an implied contract upon which the
wife relied to her detriment and focused upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel in order
to create a duty of support in the husband. Id. R.S. also reviewed K.S. v. G.S., 182 N.J.
Super. 102, 440 A.2d 64 (1981), in which the husband claimed that he withdrew his
consent to his wife's insemination. R.S., 9 Kan. App. 2d at 43, 670 P.2d at 927. The K.S.
court determined that the husband's consent was effective until the wife conceived and
that the husband had the burden of establishing that he had revoked his consent. K.S.,
182 N.J. Super. at 109-10, 440 A.2d at 68. The R.S. court also found analogous the case
of In re Marriage of L.M.S. v. S.L.S., 105 Wis. 2d 118, 312 N.W.2d 853 (1981). R.S., 9
Kan. App. 2d at 43, 670 P.2d at 927. In L.M.S., although the husband consented to his
wife's impregnation by another man, the husband claimed in divorce proceedings that he
was not obligated to support the child. LM.S., 105 Wis. 2d at 119, 312 N.W.2d at 854.
L.MS. concluded that a husband who participates in an arrangement to create a child
has a legal obligation to support that child. Id. at 122, 312 N.W.2d at 855.
92. Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 610, 528 N.E.2d at 1084. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
para. 1453 (1989).
93. Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 610-11, 528 N.E.2d at 1084. John noted that the
Illinois legislature used "must" in connection with the requirement that the husband's
consent be in writing, while the legislature used "shall" with regard to the doctor's duty
to certify the husband's signature. Id. at 610, 528 N.E.2d at 1084. John argued that the
use of the term "must," as compared to "shall," expresses a different, mandatory require-
ment. See Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 610, 528 N.E.2d at 1084. John reasoned that a
doctor's failure to comply with the duty to certify the husband's signature (prefaced in
the statute by the term "shall") does not affect the parent/child relationship. Id. John
contended that, in contrast, failure to comply with the statutory "must" language effects
the parent/child relationship, thereby releasing him from any support obligation. Id.
94. Id. at 610-11, 528 N.E.2d at 1084. Adams relied upon R.S in order to interpret
the IPA. Id. at 608-11, 528 N.E.2d at 1082-84. However, the Kansas statute upon
which the R.S. court focused does not contain the "must" language found in the IPA.
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directory rather than mandatory and concluded that the IPA al-
lows a court to impose support obligations on a husband based
upon an estoppel or waiver theory, notwithstanding his failure to
consent in writing.95
The appellate court next considered whether the trial court
abused its discretion when it found that John actually consented to
Ritaray's insemination.96 To determine whether John had con-
sented, the trial court focused on his actions both before and after
conception to determine whether he consented.97 John argued
that, in the cases cited by the trial court, the courts had relied on
oral and/or written evidence of express consent. 98 In those cases,
consent was manifested either by an affirmative act prior to the
procedure or by long-term, unequivocal acts following the proce-
dure.99 According to John, those cases were distinguishable be-
cause no similar evidence existed in his case."° Therefore, John
contended that his actions did not rise to the level of actual
consent. 01
John also argued that the trial court gave improper weight to
misleading evidence in order to establish that he had induced
Ritaray to proceed with the AID procedure. 0 2 He contended that
the trial court gave too much probative value to evidence that he
signed an authorization for medical tests; paid Ritaray's and J.D.'s
doctor and hospital bills; stayed with Ritaray during her labor; ac-
cepted joint responsibility for J.D. in the settlement agreement he
prepared; and, listed J.D. as a dependent on the couple's joint fed-
See KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 23-128, 23-130 (1981). Instead, the Kansas statute states that
insemination "may" be performed with the husband's written consent and uses the term
"shall" with reference to the husband's and the wife's duty to execute consent to the
insemination. See KANSAS STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128, 23-130 (1981). For the complete text
of the Kansas statute, see supra note 87.
95. Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 610-11, 528 N.E.2d at 1084.
96. Id at 611, 528 N.E.2d at 1084.
97. Id. at 611-13, 528 N.E.2d at 1085.
98. Id. at 613, 528 N.E.2d at 1085-86.
99. Id. Adams referred specifically to In re Marriage of L.M.S. v. S.L.S., 105 Wis. 2d
118, 312 N.W.2d 853, in which a sterile husband consented to his wife's impregnation by
another man. Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 609-10, 528 N.E.2d at 1083. In LM.S., the
husband held himself out to the public as the child's natural father and supported the
child for years. LM.S., 105 Wis. 2d at 120, 312 N.W.2d at 854. The LM.S. court held
that the husband had an obligation to provide child support. Id at 122, 312 N.W.2d at
854. For additional discussion of LM.S., see supra note 91.
100. Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 613, 528 N.E.2d at 1086.
101. Id. John claimed that although Ritaray testified that he knew of and consented
to the AID procedure, her testimony on this issue was either discredited or was inconsis-
tent with her previous testimony. Id. at 613, 528 N.E.2d at 1086.
102. See id.
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eral income tax return.10 3 John argued that this evidence could
have been construed in many ways other than as his inducement to
Ritaray to be inseminated and therefore should not have provided
a valid foundation for Ritaray's estoppel argument.1°4
The appellate court rejected all of these arguments and con-
cluded that the two strongest reasons for affirming the trial court's
finding were that the couple listed J.D. on their joint income tax
return and that the proposed settlement agreement provided for
child support. 05 The court explained that John's excuse that the
tax return was both his and Ritaray's was not sufficient to establish
that John had not recognized and taken advantage of J.D. as his
dependent." The appellate court also acknowledged that John
disagreed with the trial court's evaluation of witnesses' testi-
mony.10 7 The appellate court noted that the trial court recognized
that both John's and Ritaray's testimony had been impeached and
discredited to a certain extent. 08 Nonetheless, the court concluded
that the trial testimony raised credibility issues within the discre-
tion of the trial court to decide. °9 The court then held that the
trial court acted within its discretion when it determined that John
actually consented to the AID procedure.1°
The Adams majority also addressed the dissent's assertion that
the majority erroneously shifted the burden of proof on the consent
issue to John. " According to the majority, the dissent ignored the
fact that John raised non-consent as an affirmative defense to
Ritaray's child support claim. 2 As a result of this pleading strat-
103. Id
104. Id. at 613-14, 528 N.E.2d at 1086. John explained that as a physician's assis-
tant, he routinely signed authorizations for medical tests, which included Ritaray's tests.
Id. In addition, John explained that most of Ritaray's and J.D.'s medical expenses were
paid for by his Navy benefits. Id. John also argued that the joint income tax return that
the couple filed did not reflect his recognition of J.D. as his dependent because the return
reflected J.D. as Ritaray's dependent. Id Finally, John argued that contents of the pro-
posed settlement agreement did not reflect his consent to Ritaray's insemination because
the couple had been motivated to make the settlement appear "fair and conscionable" in
order to take advantage of Florida's inexpensive divorce proceedings. Id.
105. Id. at 614, 528 N.E.2d at 1086.
106. Id. The Adams court theorized that John could have filed a separate return.
Instead, John chose to recognize J.D. as a dependent and as a result, John should be
prohibited from failing to recognize J.D. as his dependent at a later date. Id
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 614, 528 N.E.2d at 1086-87.
110. Id. at 615, 528 N.E.2d at 1087.
Ill. Id. For discussion of the dissent, see infra notes 122-150 and accompanying
text.
112. Id. As part of his answer to Ritaray's petition for dissolution of marriage, John
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egy, the court concluded that John bore the burden of proving that
he did not consent to the AID procedure.1 3
The appellate court noted that the trial court had cited case
lawI" that established that the party who asserts estoppel bears the
burden of proof.' ' 5 According to the appellate court, although
Ritaray had the burden of proving estoppel, she also had operating
in her favor a rebuttable presumption that her husband initially
consented to the AID procedure." 6 The trial court had balanced
John's burden to demonstrate lack of consent-which he bore be-
cause he raised non-consent as an affirmative defense-with
Ritaray's presumption of his initial consent, which shifted to John
the burden of rebuttal. "7 The appellate court thus concluded that
the trial court properly had assigned the evidentiary burdens.' '1
The majority also disagreed with the dissent's argument that the
trial court inappropriately subjected John's testimony to a higher
degree of scrutiny,' 9 holding that both parties had been subjected
to equivalent levels of examination. 20  The majority explained
that, although the trial court had noted that in some cases the evi-
dence presented by the party who denies paternity is subject to
careful scrutiny, in this case, the trial court specifically stated that
the testimony of both John and Ritaray had been carefully mea-
sured against the unrebutted facts.' 2'
C. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Dunn concurred in part and dissented in part with the
majority opinion. 22 He agreed that the lack of written consent
would not preclude the court from requiring John to pay child sup-
filed an affirmative defense in which he alleged that Ritaray agreed to the AID procedure
without John's consent or knowledge. Id. In his second amended affirmative defense,
John repeated the allegations of his original affirmative defense and also contended that
he continuously had objected to Ritaray's insemination. Id. Ritaray denied those allega-
tions. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. The trial court cited Adams v. Mitchell, 89 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 412 N.E.2d
678 (1st Dist. 1980), a case not involving either Ritaray or John Adams. Id.
115. Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 615, 528 N.E.2d at 1087.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 618, 618-21, 528 N.E.2d at 1089, 1089-91 (Dunn, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
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port. 123 A husband who expressly consents to the AID procedure,
or who by his conduct induces his wife to utilize the procedure,
must be prevented from denying legal parental responsibility. 24
Justice Dunn stated that to hold otherwise might lead to uncon-
scionable results never contemplated by the legislature.1 25
Justice Dunn, however, disagreed with the majority opinion on
two points. He argued that the majority's statutory interpretation
was flawed because the majority failed to recognize that the IPA is
ambiguous. 126 The dissenting Justice also argued that the majority
allocated the burdens improperly when it delegated to John the
burden of proving that he did not consent to the procedure and
when it subjected John's testimony to careful scrutiny. 27
Justice Dunn examined the legislative history of the IPA and
stated that, during the House proceedings, a representative recog-
nized that the IPA leaves ambiguous the legal relationship between
a husband and an AID child when the wife is artificially insemi-
nated without the husband's consent.' 2s The Justice observed that
the IPA seemingly left to the courts the difficult task of determin-
ing the legal status of a husband who fails to consent in writing,
and a child born to his wife as a result of the AID procedure.'29 In
response to this ambiguity, Justice Dunn advocated placing the
burden upon the wife to establish her child's legitimacy.1 30
According to the opposing Justice, the IPA requirement of writ-
ten consent was inconsistent with the court's requirement that the
123. Id. at 619, 528 N.E.2d at 1089.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 618-19, 528 N.E.2d at 1089-90.
127. Id. at 619-20, 528 N.E.2d at 1089-90.
128. Id. at 618-19, 528 N.E.2d at 1089. In support of this observation, Justice Dunn
referred to Representative Brummer's concerns about the bill as amended by the Gover-
nor. Id. For the relevant portions of the legislative debates, see supra notes 55-66 and
accompanying text. Justice Dunn, however, misconstrued the legislative debate.
Although the IPA is indeed ambiguous with respect to the legal relationship between a
husband who fails to consent in writing and an AID child, the legislature did not address
the ambiguity to which Justice Dunn refers. See 83RD ILL. GEN. ASSEM., HOUSE PRO-
CEEDINGS, Nov. 2, 1983, 81-82 (debates on Senate Bill 61). Representative Brummer
referred only to the ambiguity of the bill as amended by the Governor's veto. See id.
129. Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 619, 528 N.E.2d at 1089. Representative Brummer
apparently believed otherwise. Brummer asserted that the IPA addresses the legal status
of the AID child and provides that in the absence of written consent, the child has no
legal father. See 83RD ILL. GEN. ASSEM., HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, Nov. 2, 1983, 81-82
(debates on Senate Bill 61). For additional discussion of Rep. Brummer's comments dur-
ing House debate, see supra note 65.
130. Id. at 620, 528 N.E.2d at 1090.
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husband prove non-consent."' Justice Dunn reasoned that if the
legislature intended for a husband to bear the burden of proof, the
statute would contain a presumption of consent, as provided in
other state statutes, 132 rather than a written consent require-
ment.133 Justice Dunn argued that the IPA requirement of written
consent should be interpreted as a legislative response to the possi-
ble problems of proof when only oral consent is alleged. 3"
Justice Dunn explained that Ritaray sought the benefits of the
IPA even though she failed to obtain John's written consent in ac-
cordance with the statute;' 3 5 as a result, she should bear the burden
of demonstrating that John consented to the procedure.' 36 The dis-
sent concluded that the court should have required Ritaray to
prove clear, unequivocal evidence of estoppel.' 37
Justice Dunn also contended that the trial court improperly sub-
jected John's testimony to "careful scrutiny."' 3  Although he
noted that careful scrutiny is appropriate when the husband denies
paternity in a natural birth, 39 Justice Dunn argued that the trial
court inappropriately applied the same scrutiny to John's testi-
mony. "0 According to Justice Dunn, the normal presumption of
legitimacy does not apply in AID cases and, therefore, careful
scrutiny should not be applied to the testimony of a husband who
fails to consent in writing to the AID procedure. '4' Rather, the
more careful level of scrutiny should have been applied to
Ritaray's testimony. 142 Justice Dunn argued that the conduct of
the party claiming estoppel may be scrutinized when there is evi-
dence suggesting that there was no explicit inducement to perform
by the other party. 43 Hence, careful scrutiny of Ritaray's testi-
mony was appropriate because she was determined to have a child
despite John's reluctance and the family's impending
131. Id. at 619, 528 N.E.2d at 1090.
132. Id. Justice Dunn referred here to K.S. v. G.S., 182 N.J. Super. 102, 440 A.2d 64
(1981), in which the court cited both the Arkansas and Maryland parentage statutes
which mandate a presumption of consent. Id. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(c) (1987);
MD. CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1986).
133. Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 619, 528 N.E.2d at 1090.
134. Id at 619-620, 528 N.E.2d at 1090.
135. Id at 620, 528 N.E.2d at 1090
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing In re Ozment, 61 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 378 N.E.2d 409 (3d Dist. 1978)).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id.
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bankruptcy. 144
Because the trial court used an improper standard of proof,145
Justice Dunn recommended that the case be reversed and re-
manded. In addition, he attached little significance to the aspects
of John's conduct upon which the trial court and the majority
placed great weight.146 For example, Justice Dunn viewed John's
listing of J.D. as a dependent on the couple's joint tax return as
insignificant. 47 A taxpayer need not be a legal parent to claim a
child as a dependent. 48 In addition, Justice Dunn observed that
by filing a joint return with Ritaray, John was entitled to list
Ritaray's child as a dependent, just as the couple listed John's three
children by his former wife as dependents. 49 It was improper to
force legal paternity upon John simply because he took advantage
of federal income tax laws. 50
D. The Supreme Court Decision
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed Adams because the trial
court applied Illinois law when it should have applied Florida
law. 5 1 The supreme court noted that prior to trial for the dissolu-
tion of their marriage, the couple stipulated that J.D.'s parentage
should be determined under Illinois law rather than Florida law. 52
The court explained that the stipulation was contrary to customary
choice of law principles because Florida had a more significant re-
lationship to the dispute. 153 The court observed that the wife had
been inseminated in Florida, that the couple had been residents of
Florida through the course of the wife's pregnancy, and the child
was born in Florida. 5 4 For that reason, the court reversed and
144. Id at 620, 528 N.E.2d at 1090
145. Id
146. Id at 621, 528 N.E.2d at 1090. Justice Dunn argued that the majority improp-
erly placed too much significance on the fact that John paid for Ritaray's medical bills
because those bills were paid as part of John's Navy benefits. Id. at 621, 528 N.E.2d at
1091. He also found aspects of John's conduct following J.D.'s conception, including
John's discussion of child care and breast feeding, to be ambiguous. Id. Justice Dunn
further noted that John's failure to voice his lack of consent to third parties was insignifi-
cant. Id Reliance on John's silence conflicts with the IPA's requirement that consent,
and not lack of consent, be memorialized. Id
147. Id
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. In re Marriage of Adams, 133 Ill. 2d 437, 447-48, 551 N.E.2d 635, 639-40
(1990).
152. Id. at 443-44, 551 N.E.2d at 637-38.
153. Id. at 447, 551 N.E.2d at 639.
154. Id.
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remanded the case for a determination as to whether the husband
has a support obligation under Florida law.155
In dicta, the supreme court examined the IPA and commented
that the written consent requirement could be considered a
mandatory prerequisite to establishing the husband as the legal fa-
ther of the AID child. 56 The court compared the IPA to the Flor-
ida parentage statute and noted that under the Florida statute, the
absence of written consent might not preclude a party from prov-
ing the child's legitimacy by other means, as under an estoppel the-
ory. 57 The court thus implied that, in the absence of a husband's
written consent, equitable relief might not be available under the
IPA.'11 Nonetheless, the court also recognized John's argument
that if written consent is not an indispensable prerequisite to estab-
lishing him as legal father, it would likely be Ritaray's burden to
establish the necessary estoppel.' 59 The court noted that placing
the burden of proof upon Ritaray might better accomplish the pur-
pose of the legislation."w The court quoted from Justice Dunn's
dissent that "[h]ad the legislature intended that the burden of prov-
ing non-consent would be on the husband, the requirement of writ-
ten consent would not have been necessary."161
IV. ANALYSIS
The IPA was enacted to clarify the legal relationships among the
parties involved in the AID procedure,162 Adams demonstrates,
155. Id. at 447-48, 551 N.E.2d at 639. The Florida parentage statute provides: "Any
child born within wedlock who has been conceived by the means of artificial insemination
is irrebuttably presumed to be legitimate, provided that both the husband and wife have
consented in writing to the artificial insemination." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (1986).
156. Adams, 133 Ill. 2d at 444, 551 N.E.2d at 638 (citing Andrews v. Foxworthy, 71
Ill. 2d 13, 21, 373 N.E.2d 1332, 1335 (1978) ("must" generally construed as mandatory)).
157. Id. at 445, 551 N.E.2d at 638. With reference to the Florida statute, the court
stated that "the absence of written consent might simply fail to establish an irrebuttable
presumption of legitimacy, and legitimacy might still be provable by other means, such as
under an estoppel theory." Id. In support of applying Florida law, the court stated: "We
do not believe that we should allow the minor to forgo what benefits may exist for him
under the Florida statute and to stipulate instead to the application of perhaps the more
stringent provision." Id. at 447, 551 N.E.2d at 639. For the full text of the Florida
statute, see supra note 155.
158. See id. The supreme court, however, did not foreclose the possibility that a
support obligation might be imposed irrespective of whether legitimacy was provable
under the IPA. Id.
159. Id. at 448, 551 N.E.2d at 639.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 448, 551 N.E.2d at 639-40.
162. See supra notes 48-66 and accompanying text. Indeed, the IPA is entitled "An
Act to define the legal relationships of a child born to a wife and husband requesting and
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however, that the IPA has in fact blurred the relationships it
sought to clarify. 163 The primary problem with the IPA is that it
fails explicitly to address situations in which the husband does not
consent in writing to his wife's insemination. 16 As a result, the
statute is ambiguous.
This ambiguity yields three possible, and conflicting, interpreta-
tions of the IPA. Under one interpretation, the written consent
requirement is mandatory and in the absence of such consent, the
AID child has no legal father and the husband has no support obli-
gation. A second interpretation views the requirement of written
consent as simply directory, thus allowing the wife to pursue an
equitable remedy under which the husband may be forced to pro-
vide support in the absence of written consent. Under this inter-
pretation, the written consent requirement places the burden on
the wife to establish that her husband consented to the insemina-
tion if his written consent was not obtained. A third interpretation
also views the IPA's written consent requirement as directory, but
recognizes a presumption of initial consent that shifts the burden
to the husband to rebut the presumption with evidence demon-
strating that he did not consent to his wife's insemination.
As suggested by the Illinois Supreme Court opinion in Adams,
the first interpretation finds support in the plain language of the
IPA. 165 The IPA provides that if a woman is artificially insemi-
nated, her husband will be considered the natural father if he gives
written consent to the procedure. 166 Additionally, under the IPA,
consenting to heterologous artificial insemination." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 1451-
1453 (1989).
163. For a critical discussion of the IPA, see Comment, The Legal Incubation of
Artificial Insemination: A Proposal to Amend the Illinois Parentage Act, 78 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 797 (1985). According to that Comment, the IPA "fails to adequately define the
relationship of an [AID child] born to a married couple." Id. at 797.
164. Id. at 798. In its comment to section 5 of the UPA, on which the IPA is largely
based, the National Conference on Commissioners on Uniform State Laws suggested that
state legislatures should consider further the legal issues raised by artificial insemination
prior to adopting the UPA without modification. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B
U.L.A. 302 (1987) (Commissioners' comment). The Commissioners noted that the UPA
does address many of the complex and legal problems raised by artificial insemination.
Id. Apparently, the Illinois legislature dismissed this suggestion when they drafted the
IPA.
165. Adams, 133 Ill. 2d at 444-45, 551 N.E.2d at 638. The Illinois Supreme Court
noted, in dicta, that the IPA's requirement that consent "must be in writing" may be
considered a mandatory requirement for establishing a parent/child relationship. Id. at
444, 551 N.E.2d at 638 (citing Andrews v. Foxworthy, 71 11. 2d 13, 21, 373 N.E.2d 1332,
1335 (1978) ("must" generally construed as mandatory)).
166. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, para. 1452 (1989). For the full text of this section, see
supra note 54.
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the donor never will be considered the legal father of the AID
child. 167  Under this interpretation, the language of IPA means
that a child conceived through artificial insemination will be con-
sidered legitimate under the IPA only if his mother obtained writ-
ten consent from her husband; thus, in the absence of written
consent, the child will have no legal father. The mandatory 'lan-
guage of the IPA would prevent a wife who does not obtain her
husband's written consent from availing herself of an equitable
remedy. Accordingly, once a child is conceived by artificial insem-
ination without the husband's written consent, a court may not
inquire into the circumstances surrounding the insemination, and
the court thus is forced to deny the child legitimacy.
The problem with this interpretation, however, is that it entirely
fails to consider the best interests of the AID child. Although nat-
urally conceived children are entitled to a presumption of legiti-
macy, the mandatory language in the IPA prevents the AID child
from being considered legitimate unless the wife obtains her hus-
band's consent. This harsh result contradicts the presumption of
legitimacy that pervades both common law and Illinois statutes. 168
Earlier case law provides that, based on public policy and morality,
AID children are not entitled to a presumption of legitimacy. 169
Today, this view seems outdated.
Under current law, even a child resulting from an adulterous
relationship is entitled to a presumption of legitimacy.170 The only
distinction between a child born as a result of an adulterous liaison
and an AID child is that an AID child is conceived with the help
of a syringe and donor sperm. That distinction does not justify
denying the AID child the same protection under the law as a nat-
urally conceived child.'71
167. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1453 (1989). For commentary on the rights of the
AID donor as parent, see Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L.
331, 343-44 (1980). See also In the Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (semen
donor brought paternity action to establish parental rights of AID child).
168. For additional discussion of this presumption, see supra notes 26-29 and accom-
panying text.
169. See Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct. Cook County, Ill.
Dec. 13, 1954), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d
844 (1956). For additional discussion of Doornbos, see supra notes 43-47 and accompany-
ing text.
170. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2505 (1989). For the text of this provision, see
supra note 27.
171. See generally Comment, supra note 22, at 921. The "single most important is-
sue" surrounding AID is the legal status of the AID child. Id. "Not only will a finding
of legitimacy directly affect the child's acceptance and alleviate psychological trauma that
may result from stigmatization as an illegitimate, it indirectly forms the basis for other
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The second interpretation of the IPA-that written consent is
directory rather than mandatory-was advocated by the dissent in
Adams. 172 The difference between the first interpretation and the
second is significant because the latter allows a wife who does not
obtain her husband's written consent to pursue equitable relief to
establish her child's paternity. Under this interpretation, the child
is not entitled to a presumption of legitimacy and the wife bears the
burden of proving that her husband actually consented by his ac-
tions to her insemination.
73
This approach also is flawed. It disregards the mandatory lan-
guage of the IPA to provide the wife with an equitable remedy. By
interpreting the IPA's language as directory, the dissent's interpre-
tation is inconsistent with the statute's plain meaning. Moreover,
under the second interpretation, and in the absence of written con-
sent, the AID child would have no legal father unless the mother
could prove that her husband had otherwise consented to her in-
semination.' 74 Like the result achieved under the first interpreta-
tion, this result does not address the best interests of the AID child
because it fails explicitly to extend to the AID child the presump-
tion of legitimacy to which naturally conceived children are
entitled.
The majority in Adams advocated the third interpretation,
which also maintains that the written consent requirement is
merely directory. As demonstrated in the majority opinion in Ad-
ams, it is possible to view the statute's silence on the subject of
legal paternity when the mother does not obtain written consent as
an invitation to the courts to provide an equitable remedy. 75 In
addition, the third interpretation recognizes a presumption of ini-
rights and obligations of the parties involved, such as inheritance, visitation, and sup-
port." Id.
172. See Adams, 174 111. App. 3d at 619, 528 N.E.2d at 1089 (Dunn, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). Justice Dunn reasoned that the language was not mandatory
because to view the IPA as mandatory would lead to "unconscionable results never in-
tended by the legislature." Id.
173. Justice Dunn reasoned that if the legislature had intended the burden of proving
non-consent to fall upon the husband, then the requirement of written consent would not
have been necessary. Id. at 619, 529 N.E.2d at 1090. He noted that if a wife failed to
comply with the IPA, then her child is no longer protected by the statute and she must
bear the burden of proving that her husband consented to the insemination. Id. at 620,
528 N.E.2d at 1090 Justice Dunn argued that if a wife is inseminated because she rea-
sonably relies on conduct by her husband that indicates his consent to the procedure,
then the husband may be estopped from denying that he is the legal father of the AID
child. See id.
174. For discussion regarding the donor's legal status, see supra note 167 and accom-
panying text.
175. Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 610-11, 528 N.E.2d at 1084.
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tial consent by the husband that shifts the burden of proving non-
consent to the husband.176 This presumption of initial consent op-
erates to establish the husband as the AID child's father unless the
husband can rebut the presumption and prove that he did not con-
sent to his wife's insemination. Considered in this light, the pre-
sumption of initial consent is indistinguishable from a presumption
that the AID child is legitimate.
Like the second interpretation, the third interpretation is flawed
because it fails to follow the mandatory language of the IPA. The
primary problem with the approach is that the court recognized
the functional equivalent of a presumption of legitimacy that has
no foundation in the IPA. The IPA contains no language to sug-
gest that the husband is required to prove that he did not consent
to the insemination in order to escape legal paternity, nor does it
explicitly set forth any presumption of initial consent or
legitimacy. 1 77
Indeed, during the legislative debates surrounding the IPA, Rep-
resentative Brummer noted that Illinois law establishes an almost
irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy for naturally conceived
children; he specifically added that this presumption would not ap-
ply to children conceived through artificial insemination. 1 7
Doornbos, which held that AID children are illegitimate, is in com-
plete accord with Brummer's remark. The decision remains good
law in Illinois.179
The most vulnerable party involved in the AID procedure is the
resulting child.1 80 By enacting the IPA, the Illinois legislature did
little to protect the interests of the AID child. Using any of the
three possible interpretations of the IPA, it is impossible to protect
the best interest of the AID child and to remain consistent with the
statute's mandatory requirement of written consent. Under the
first interpretation, if the consent requirement is mandatory, as its
plain language suggests, the logical result is unconscionable be-
cause this interpretation places in jeopardy the AID child's legiti-
176. Id. at 615, 528 N.E.2d at 1087.
177. See ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 40, paras. 1452-1453 (1989). For the full text of these
provisions, see supra note 54.
178. 83RD ILL. GEN. ASSEM., HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, Nov. 2, 1983, 82 (debates on
Senate bill 61).
179. For a discussion of the Doornbos case, see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying
text.
180. For commentary on the interests of the AID child, see J. GLOVER, ETHICS OF
NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 48-51 (1989); G. ANNAS & S. ELIAS, supra note 3,
at 241. Primary consideration should always be given to the "best interests" of the poten-
tial child, rather than to any other party involved. Id. at 241.
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macy. The second interpretation avoids the logical result of the
statute's mandatory language by allowing the wife the option of an
equitable remedy, yet it also fails adequately to protect the AID
child's interest by failing to extend to the child the presumption of
legitimacy afforded to naturally conceived children. Finally, the
third interpretation urged by the majority in Adams departs even
further from the mandatory written consent requirement because it
disregards the statutory language and places the burden upon the
husband to establish his non-consent to the AID procedure. The
majority's interpretation comes closest, however, to equalizing the
rights of AID children with those of naturally conceived children.
Any of the three approaches leaves the legal status of the AID
child in jeopardy.'8 1 For this reason, the IPA should be modified
to clearly establish who the presumed legal parents of the AID
child are if the husband has not given written consent to his wife's
artificial insemination, and to incorporate a presumption of the
husband's consent to the procedure. 182
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
In 1988, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws adopted the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act, 183 which incorporates a presumption that children
conceived by AID are legitimate. I" When a married woman bears
a child using AID, this Act declares her husband the legal father of
181. See Comment, supra note 163, at 798. Under the IPA, the legal status of the
AID child, absent the husband's consent, is highly speculative. Id.
182. For discussion of analogous proposed modifications to Ohio's Parentage Act, see
Eisenman, Fathers, Biological and Anonymous and Other Legal Strangers: Determination
of Parentage and Artificial Insemination by Donor Under Ohio Law, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 383
(1984).
183. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 9B U.L.A. 87-
102 (Supp. 1990).
184. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 91
(Supp. 1990). Section 3 provides:
[Except as provided in Sections 5 through 9 of this [Act]], the husband of a
woman who bears a child through assisted conception is the father of the child,
notwithstanding any declaration of invalidity or annulment of the marriage ob-
tained after the assisted conception, unless within two years after learning of the
child's birth he commences an action in which the mother and the child are
parties and in which it is determined that he did not consent to the assisted
conception.
Id. Currently, only one state, North Dakota, has adopted the Uniform Status of Children
of Assisted Conception Act. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION
ACT, 9B U.L.A. 8 (Prefatory table, Supp. 1990).
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the child. 8 5 The only exception recognized by this Act occurs
when the husband commences an action against the mother and
the child within two years of learning of the birth and establishes
that he did not consent to the assisted conception.1
8 6
Unlike the IPA, this Act is responsive to situations in which the
husband claims that he did not consent to the procedure by creat-
ing a rebuttable presumption that the husband consented to the
procedure. As a result, a nonconsenting husband has both the op-
portunity and the burden to establish his non-consent. Under the
Uniform Act, the AID child is afforded at least some protection
lacking under the IPA. Additionally, an AID child, conceived
without the husband's initial consent, but later accepted and
wanted by that husband, would not face the risk of illegitimacy.
The IPA should be revised to incorporate a similar presumption
of legitimacy. This revision would alleviate unnecessary litigation
over support obligations. This change also would guarantee AID
children the same legal status as their naturally conceived counter-
parts. The newly adopted Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act includes this presumption and should serve as a
model for the Illinois legislature when it amends the IPA.
VI. CONCLUSION
Adams exposes a significant deficiency in the Illinois Parentage
Act. In its current form, the IPA fails to address the full spectrum
of legal problems that face the AID child. For that reason, the
IPA should be amended to incorporate a presumption that chil-
dren born as a result of the AID procedure are legitimate. Artifi-
cial insemination is destined to remain a viable and often utilized
solution to the problem of infertility. Combined with climbing di-
vorce rates and changing family relationships, the use of artificial
insemination will continue to produce legal problems similar to
those presented in Adams. In response to those problems, and in
order to safeguard the interests of the resulting children, the Illi-
nois legislature must enact laws that are responsive to the unique
situation of the AID child.
LAUREN S. SMITH
185. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 91
(Supp. 1990).
186. Id.
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